Telcos should focus on "connected data"​ not just "edge computing"​

Note: A version of this article first appeared as a guest blog post written for Cloudera, linked to a webinar presentation on May 4, 2022. See the sign-up link in the comments. This version has minor changes to fit the tone & audience of this newsletter, and tie in with previous themes. This version is also published on my LinkedIn newsletter with a comments thread (here).

Telcos and other CSPs are rethinking their approach to enterprise services in the era of advanced wireless connectivity - including their 5G, fibre and Software-Defined Wide Area Network (SD-WAN) portfolios. 

Many consumer-centric operators are developing propositions for “verticals”, often combining on-site or campus mobile networks with edge computing, plus deeper solutions for specific industries or horizontal applications. Part of this involves helping enterprises deal with their data and overall cloud connectivity as well as local networks. (The original MNO vision of delivering enterprise networks as "5G network slices" partitioned from their national infrastructure has taken a back seat. There is more interest currently in the creation of dedicated on-premise private 5G networks, via telcos' enterprise or integrator units).

At the same time, telecom operators are also becoming more data- and cloud-centric themselves. They are using disaggregated systems such as Open RAN and cloud-native 5G cores, plus distributed compute and data, for their own requirements. This is aimed at running their networks more efficiently, and dealing with customers and operations more flexibly. There are both public and private cloud approaches to this, with hyperscalers like Amazon and disruptors such as Rakuten Symphony and Totogi promising revolutions in future.

As I've said for some time, “The first industry that 5G will transform is the telecom industry itself.”

This poses both opportunities and challenges. Telcos’ internal data and cloud needs may not mirror their corporate customers’ strategies and timing perfectly, especially given the diverse connectivity landscape.

If operators truly want to blend their own transformation journey with that of their customers, what is needed is a much broader view of the “networked cloud” and "distributed data", not just the “telco cloud” or "telco edge" that many like to discuss.

Networked data and cloud are not just “edge computing”

Telecom operators’ discussions around edge/cloud have gone in two separate directions in recent years:

• External edge computing: The desire by MNOs to deploy in-network edge nodes for end-user applications such as V2X, IoT control, smart city functions, low-latency cloud gaming, or enterprise private networks. Often called “MEC” (mobile edge computing), this spans both in-house edge solutions and a variety of collaborations with hyperscalers such as Azure, Google Cloud Platform, and Amazon Web Services.
• Internal: The use of cloud platforms for telcos’ own infrastructure and systems, especially for cloud-native cores, flexible billing, and operational support systems (BSS/OSS), plus new open and virtualised RAN technology for disaggregated 4G/5G deployments. Some functions need to be deployed at the edge of the network (such as 5G DUs and UPF cores), while others can be more centralised.

Of these two trends, the latter has seen more real-world utilisation. It is linked to solving clear and immediate problems for the CSPs themselves.

Many operators are working with public and private clouds for their operational needs—running networks, managing subscriber data and experience, and enabling more automation and control. While there are raging debates about “openness” vs. outsourcing to hyperscalers, the underlying story—cloudification of telcos’ networks and IT estates—is consistent and accelerating. The timing constraints of radio signal processing in Open RAN, and the desire to manage ultra-low latency 5G “slices” in future 3GPP releases are examples that need edge compute. There may also be roles for edge billing/charging, and various security functions.

In contrast, telcos' customer-facing cloud, edge and data offers have been much slower to emerge. The focus and hype about MEC has meant operators’ emphasis has been on deploying “mini data centres” deep in their networks—at cell towers or aggregation sites, or fixed-operators’ existing central office locations. Discussion has centred on “low latency” applications as the key differentiator for CSP-enabled 5G edge. The focus has also been centred on compute rather than data storage and analysis. Few telcos have given much consideration to "data at rest" rather than "data in motion" - but both are important for developers.

This has meant a disconnect between the original MEC concept and the real needs of enterprises and developers. In reality, enterprises need their data and compute to occur in multiple locations, and to be used across multiple time frames—from real time closed-loop actions, to analysis of long-term archived data. It may also span multiple clouds—as well as on-premise and on-device capabilities beyond the network itself.

What is needed is a more holistic sense of “networked cloud” to tie these diverse data storage and processing needs together, along with documentation of connectivity and the physical source and path of data transmission.

Potentially there are some real sources of telco differentiation here - as opposed to some of the more fanciful MEC visions, which are more realistically MNOs just acting as channel partners for AWS Outposts and Azure's equivalent Private MEC.

An example of the “networked cloud”

Consider an example: video cameras for a smart city. There are numerous applications, ranging from public transit and congestion control, to security and law enforcement, identification of free parking spots, road toll enforcement, or analysing footfall trends for retailers and urban planners. In some places, cameras have been used to monitor social-distancing or mask-wearing during the pandemic. The applications vary widely in terms of immediacy, privacy issues, use of historical data, or the need for correlation between multiple cameras. 

CSPs have numerous potential roles here, both for underlying connectivity and the higher-value services and applications.

But there may be a large gap between when “compute” occurs, compared to when data is collected and how it is stored. Short-term image data storage and real-time analysis might be performed on the cameras themselves, an in-network MEC node, or at a large data centre, perhaps with external AI resources or combined with other data sets. Longer-term data for trend analysis or historic access to event footage could be archived either in a city-specific facility or in hyperscale sites.

(I wrote a long article about Edge AI and analytics last year - see here)

For some applications, there will need to be strong proofs of security and data custody, especially if there are evidentiary requirements for law enforcement. That may extend to knowing (and controlling) the specific paths across which data transits, how it is stored, and the privacy and tamper-resistance compliance mechanisms employed.

Similar situations—with both opportunities and challenges—exist in verticals from vehicle-to-everything to healthcare to education to financial services and manufacturing. CSPs could become involved in the “networked cloud” and data-management across these areas—but they need to look beyond narrow views of edge-compute. Telcos are far from being the only contenders to run these types of services, but some operators are taking it seriously - Singtel offers video analytics for retail stores, for instance.

Location-specific data

As a result, the next couple of years may see something of a shift in telcos’ discussions and ambitions around enterprise data. There will be huge opportunities emerging around enterprise data’s chain-of-custody and audit trails—not only defining where processing takes place, but also where and how data is stored, when it is transmitted, and the paths it takes across the network(s) and cloud(s).

(A theme for another newsletter article or LI post is on enterprises' growing compliance headaches for data transit - especially for international networks. There may be cybersecurity risks or sanctions restrictions on transit through some countries or intermediary networks, for instance. Some corporations are even getting direct access into Internet exchanges and peering-points for greater control).

In some cases, CSPs will take a lead role here, especially where they own and control the endpoints and applications involved. Then they can better coordinate the compute and data-storage resources. In other cases, they will play supporting roles to others that have true end-to-end visibility. There will need to be bi-directional APIs—essentially, telcos become both importers and exporters of data and connectivity. This is especially true in the mobile and 5G domain, where there will inevitably be connectivity “borders” that data will need to transit. (A recent post on the need for telcos to take on both lead and support roles is here)

There may be particular advantages for location-specific data collected or managed by operators. For example, weather sensors co-located with mobile towers could provide useful situational awareness both for the telco’s own operational purposes as well as to enterprise or public-sector customers, such as smart city authorities or agricultural groups. 

Telcos also have a variety of end-device fleets that they directly own, or could offer as a managed service—for instance their own vehicles, or city-wide security cameras. These can leverage the operator’s own connectivity (typically 5G) as well as anchor some of the data origination and consumption.

Conclusion

Telecom operators should shift their enterprise focus from mobile edge computing (MEC) to a wider approach built around "networked data". Much of the enterprise edge will reside beyond the network and telco control, in devices or on-premise gateways and servers. Essentially no enterprise IT/IoT systems will be wholly run "in" the 5G or fixed telco network, as virtual functions in a 3GPP or ORAN stack.

They instead should look for involvement in end-point devices, where data is generated, where and when it is stored and processed—and also the paths through the network it takes. This would align their propositions with connectivity (between objects or applications) as well as property (the physical location of edge data centres or network assets).

There are multiple stages to get to this new proposition of “networked cloud”, and not all operators will be willing or able to fulfil the whole vision. They will likely need to partner with the cloud players, as well as think carefully about treatment of network and regulatory boundaries.

Nevertheless, the broadening of scope from “edge compute” to “networked cloud” seems inevitable. The role of telcos as pure-play "edge" specialists makes little sense and may even be a distraction from the real opportunities emerging at higher levels of abstraction.

The original version of this article is at https://blog.cloudera.com/telco-5g-returns-will-come-from-enterprise-data-solutions/

I'll be speaking on an upcoming webinar with @cloudera about "Enterprise data in the #5G era" on May 4, 2022 - https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/3531625172953644816

#cloud #edgecomputing #5G #telecoms #latency #IoT #smartcities #mobile #telcos

Geopolitics, war & network diversity

This post was originally published on my LinkedIn Newsletter (here). Please sign up, and join the discussion thread there.

Background

I'm increasingly finding myself drawn into discussions of #geopolitics and how it relates to #telecoms. This goes well beyond normal regulatory and policymaking involvement, as it means that rules - and opportunities and risks - are driven by much larger "big picture" strategic global trends, including the war in Ukraine.

As well as predicting strategic shifts, there are also lessons to be learned from events at a local, tactical level which have wider ramifications. Often, there will be trade-offs against normal telecoms preoccupations with revenue growth, theoretical "efficiency" of spectrum or network use, standardisation, competition and consumer welfare.

This is the first of what will probably be a regular set of articles on this broader theme. Here, I'm focusing on the Ukraine war, in the context some of the other geopolitical factors that I think are important. I'm specifically thinking about what they may mean for the types of network technology that are used, deployed and developed in future. This has implications for #5G, #6G, #satellite networks, #WiFi, #FTTX and much more, including the cloud/edge domains that support much of it. 

 

Ukraine and other geopolitical issues

This article especially drills into how the conflict in Ukraine has manifested in terms of telecoms and connectivity, and attempts to extrapolate to some early recommendations for policymakers more broadly.

I'm acutely consicous of the ongoing devastation and hideous war crimes being perpetrated there - I hope this isn't too early to try to analyse the narrow field of networking dispassionately, while conflict still rages.

For context, as well as Ukraine, other geopolitical issues impacting telecoms include:

• US / West vs. China tensions, from trade wars to broader restrictions on the use of Huawei and other vendors' equipment, as well as sanctions on the export of components.
• Impact of the pandemic on supply chains, plus the greater strategic and political importance of resilient telecom networks and devices in the past two years.
• The politics of post-pandemic recovery, industrial strategy and stimulus funds. Does this go to broadband deployment, themes such as Open RAN, national networks, smart cities/infrastructure, satellite networks... or somewhere else?
• Tensions within the US, and between US and Europe over the role and dominance of "Big Tech". Personal data, monopoly behaviour, censorship or regional sovereignty etc. This mostly doesn't touch networks today, but maybe cloud-native will draw attention.
• Semiconductor supply-chain challenges and the geopolitical fragility of Taiwan's chip-fabrication sector.
• How telecoms (and cloud) fits within Net Zero strategies, either as a consumer of energy, or as an enabler of green solutions.
• Cyber threats from nation-state actors, criminal cartels and terrorist-linked groups - especially aimed at critical infrastructure and health/government/finance systems.

In other words, there's a lot going on. It will impact 5G, 6G development, vendor landscapes, cloud - and also other areas such as spectrum policy and Internet governance.

Network diversity as a focus

I've written and spoken before about the importance of "network diversity" and the dangers of technology monocultures, including over-reliance on particular standards (eg 5G) or particular business models (eg national MNOs) as some sort of universal platform. It is now clear that it is more important than ever.

The analogy I made with agriculture, or ecological biodiversity, is proving to be robust.

(Previous work includes this article from 2020 about private enterprise networks, or my 2017 presentation keynote on future disruptions, at Ofcom's spectrum conference. (The blue/yellow image of wheat fields, repeated here in this post, was chosen long before it became so resonant as the Ukrainian flag). I've also covered the shift towards Open RAN and telecoms supplier diversification – including a long report I submitted to the UK Government's Diversification Task Force last year - see this post and download the report).

A key takeout from my Open RAN report was that demand diversity is as important as creating more supply choices in a given product domain. Having many classes of network operator and owner – for instance national MNOs, enterprise private 4G/5G, towercos, industrial MNOs and neutral hosts – tends to pull through multiple options for supply in terms of both vendor diversity and technology diversity. They have different requirements, different investment criteria and different operational models.

In Ukraine, the "demands" for connectivity are arising from an even more broad set of sources, including improvised communications for refugees, drones and military personnel.

The war in Ukraine & telecoms

There have been numerous articles published which highlight the surprising resilience and importance of Ukrainian telecoms during the war so far. Bringing together and synthesising multiple sources, this has highlighted a number of important issues around network connectivity:

• The original “survivability” concept of IP networks seems to have been demonstrated convincingly. Whether used for ISPs’ Internet access, or internal backhaul and transport for public fixed and mobile networks, the ability for diverse and resilient routing paths seems to have mostly been successful.
• Public national mobile networks - mostly 4G in Ukraine's case - have proven essential in many ways, whether that has been for reporting information about enemy combatants' locations and activities, obtaining advice from government authorities, or dealing with the evacuation as refugees. (I'm not sure if subway stations used as shelters have underground cellular coverage, or if there is WiFi). Authorities also seem to have had success in getting citizens to self-censor, to avoid disclosing sensitive details to their enemies.
• Reportedly the Russian forces haven't generally targeted telecoms infrastructure on a widescale basis. This was partly because they have been using commerical mobile networks themselves. However, because roaming was disabled, Russian military use of their encrypted handsets and SIMs on public 3G/4G networks seems to have failed. Two articles here and here give good insight, and also suggests there may be network surveillance backdoors which Russia may have exploited. There have also been reports of stingrays ("fake" base stations used for interception of calls / identity) being deployed. It also appears that some towns and cities - notably the destroyed city of Mariupol - have been mostly knocked offline, partly because the electrical grid was attacked first.
• Ukraine’s competitive telecoms market has probably helped its resilience. There is a highly fragmented fixed ISP landscape, with very inexpensive connections. There are over a dozen public peering-points across the country. There are three main MNOs, with many users having SIMs from 2+ operators. (This is a good overview article - https://ukraineworld.org/articles/ukraine-explained/key-facts-about-ukraines-telecom-industry). It seems they have enabled some form of national roaming to allow subscribers to attach to each others' networks.
• WiFi hotspots (likely with mobile backhaul) have been used by NGOs evacuating refugees by buses.
• Although it is still only being used at a small scale, the LEO satellite terminals from SpaceX’s StarLink seem to be an important contributor to connectivity – not least as a backup option. Realistically, satellite isn’t appropriate for millions of individual homes – and especially not personal vehicles and smartphones – but is an important part of the overall network-diversity landscape. Various commentators have suggested it is useful as a backup for critical infrastructure connectivity, as well as for mobile units such as special forces.
• Another satellite broadband provider, Viasat, apparently suffered a cyberattack at the start of the war (link here), which knocked various modem users offline (or even "bricked" the devies), reportedly including Ukrainian government organisations. Investigations haven't officially named Russia, but a coincidence seems improbable. This attack also impacted users outside Ukraine.
• Various peer-to-peer apps using Bluetooth or WiFi allow direct connections between phones, even if wide area connections are down (see link)
• There have been some concerning reports about the impact of GPS jammers on the operation of cellular networks, which may use it as a source of “timing synchronisation” to operate properly, especially for TDD radio bands. While this has long been a risk for individual cell-sites from low-power transmitters, the use of deliberate electronic warfare tools could potentially point to broader vulnerabilities in future.
• There has been wide use of commercial drones like the DJI Mavic-3 for surveillance (video and thermal imaging), or modified to deliver improvised weaponry. These use WiFi to connect to controllers on the ground, as well as a proprietary video transmission protocols (called O3+) which apparently has range of up to 15km using unlicensed spectrum. Some of the "Aerorozvidka" units reportedly then use StarLink terminals to connect back to command sites to coordinate artillery attacks (link).

In short, it seems that Ukraine has been well served by having lots of connectivity options - probably including some additional military systems that aren't widely discussed. It has benefited from multiple fixed, cellular and satellite networks, with potential for interconnect, plus inventive "quick fixes" after failures and collaboration between providers. It is exploiting licensed and unlicensed spectrum, with cellular, Wi-Fi and other technologies.

In other words, network diversity is working properly. There appears to be no single point of failure, despite deliberate attacks by invading forces and hackers. Connectivity is far from perfect, but it has held up remarkably well. Perhaps the full range of electronic warfare options hasn't been used - but given the geographical size of Ukraine and the inability of Russia forces to maintain supply-lines to distant units, that is also unsurprising.

Another set of issues that I haven't really examined are around connectivity within sanctions-hit Russia. Maybe it will have to develop more local network equipment manufacturers - if they can get the necessary silicon and other components. It probably will not wish to over-rely on Huawei & ZTE any more than some Western countries have been happy with Nokia and Ericsson as primary options. More problematic may be fixed-Internet routers, servers, WiFi APs and other Western-dominated products. I can't say I'm sympathetic, and I certainly don't want to offer suggestions. Let's see what happens.

Recommendations for policymakers, industry bodies and regulators

So what are the implications of all this? Hopefully, few other countries face a similar invasion by a large and hostile army. But preparedness is wise, especially for countries with unfriendly neighbours and territorial disputes. And even for everywhere else, the risks of cyberattacks, terrorism, natural disasters - or even just software bugs or human error - are still significant.

I should stress that I'm not a cybersecurity or critical infrastructure specialist. But I can read across from other trends I'm seeing in telecoms, and in particular I'm doing a lot of work on "path dependency" where small, innocent-seeming actions end up having long-term strategic impacts and can lock-in technology trajectories.

My initial set of considerations and recommendations:

• As a general principle, divergence in technology should be considered at least as positively than convergence. It maintains optionality, fosters innovation and reduces single-point-of-failure risks.
• National networks and telcos (fixed and mobile) are essential - but cannot do everything. They also need to cooperate during emergencies - a spirit of collaboration which seems to have worked well during the pandemic in many countries.
• Normal ideas about cyber-resilience and security may not extend to the impact of full-scale military electronic warfare units, as well as more "typical" online hacking and malware attacks.
• Having separate "air-gapped" networks available makes sense not just for critical communications (military, utilities etc) but for more general use. It isn't inefficient - it's insurance. There may be implications here for network-sharing in some instances.
• Thought needs to be given to emergency fallbacks and improvised work-arounds, for instance in the event of mass power outages or sabotage. This is particularly important for software/cloud-based networks, which may be less "fixable" in the field. Can a 5G network be "bodged"? (that's "MacGyvred" to my US friends)? As a sidenote - how have electric vehicles fared in Ukraine?
• Unlicensed spectrum and "permissionless communications" is hugely important during emergency situations. Yes, it doesn't have control or lawful intercept. But that's entirely acceptable in extreme circumstances.
• Linkages between technologies, access networks and control/identity planes should generally be via gateways that can be closed, controlled or removed if necessary. If one is attacked, the rest should be firewalled off from it. For the same reason "seamless" should be a red-flag word for cross-tech / cross-network roaming. Seams are important. They offer control and the ability to partition if necessary. "Frictionless" is OK, as long as friction can be re-imposed if needed.
• Governments should be extremely cautious of telcos extending 3GPP control mechanisms – especially the core network and slicing – to fixed broadband infrastructure. Fixed broadband is absolutely critical, and complex software dependencies may trade off fine-grained control vs. resilience - and offer additional threat surfaces.
• Democratising and improving satellite communications looks like an ever more wise move, for all sorts of reasons. It's not a panacea, but it's certainly "air-gapped" as above. 3GPP-based "non-terrestrial" networks, eg based on drones or balloons, also has potential - but will ideally be able to work independently of terrestrial networks if needed.
• I haven't heard much about LPWAN and LoRa-type networks, but I can imagine that being useful in emergency situations too.
• Sanctions, trade wars and supply-chain issues are highly unpredictable in terms of intended and unintended consequences. Technology diversity helps mitigate this, alongside supplier diversity in any one network domain.
• Spectrum policy should enable enough scale economies to ensure good supply of products (and viability of providers), but not *so* much scale that any one option drives out alternatives.
• The role and impact of international bodies like ITU, GSMA and 3GPP needs careful scrutiny. We are likely to see them become even more political in future. If necessary, there may have to be separate "non-authoritarian" and "authoritarian" versions of some standards (and spectrum policies). De-coupling and de-layering technologies' interdependency - especially radio and core networks - could isolate "disagreements" in certain layers, without undermining the whole international collaboration.
• There should be a rudimentary basic minimum level of connectivity that uses "old" products and standards. Maybe we need to keep a small slice of 900MHz spectrum alive for generator-powered GSM cells and a box of cheap phones in bunkers - essentially a future variant of Ham Radio.

So to wrap up, I'm ever more convinced that Network Diversity is essential. Not only does it foster innovation, and limit oligopoly risk, but it also enables more options in tragic circumstances. We should also consider the potential risks of too much sophistication and pursuit of effiency and performance at all costs. What happens when things break (or get deliberately broken)?

In the meantime, I'm hoping for a quick resolution to this awful war. Slava Ukraini!

Sidenote: I am currently researching the areas of “technology lock-in” and “path dependence”. In particular, I have been investigating the various mechanisms by which lock-in occurs and strategies for spotting its incipience, or breaking out of it. Please get in touch with me, if this is an area of interest for you.