Geopolitics, war & network diversity

This post was originally published on my LinkedIn Newsletter (here). Please sign up, and join the discussion thread there.

Background

I'm increasingly finding myself drawn into discussions of #geopolitics and how it relates to #telecoms. This goes well beyond normal regulatory and policymaking involvement, as it means that rules - and opportunities and risks - are driven by much larger "big picture" strategic global trends, including the war in Ukraine.

As well as predicting strategic shifts, there are also lessons to be learned from events at a local, tactical level which have wider ramifications. Often, there will be trade-offs against normal telecoms preoccupations with revenue growth, theoretical "efficiency" of spectrum or network use, standardisation, competition and consumer welfare.

This is the first of what will probably be a regular set of articles on this broader theme. Here, I'm focusing on the Ukraine war, in the context some of the other geopolitical factors that I think are important. I'm specifically thinking about what they may mean for the types of network technology that are used, deployed and developed in future. This has implications for #5G, #6G, #satellite networks, #WiFi, #FTTX and much more, including the cloud/edge domains that support much of it. 

 

Ukraine and other geopolitical issues

This article especially drills into how the conflict in Ukraine has manifested in terms of telecoms and connectivity, and attempts to extrapolate to some early recommendations for policymakers more broadly.

I'm acutely consicous of the ongoing devastation and hideous war crimes being perpetrated there - I hope this isn't too early to try to analyse the narrow field of networking dispassionately, while conflict still rages.

For context, as well as Ukraine, other geopolitical issues impacting telecoms include:

• US / West vs. China tensions, from trade wars to broader restrictions on the use of Huawei and other vendors' equipment, as well as sanctions on the export of components.
• Impact of the pandemic on supply chains, plus the greater strategic and political importance of resilient telecom networks and devices in the past two years.
• The politics of post-pandemic recovery, industrial strategy and stimulus funds. Does this go to broadband deployment, themes such as Open RAN, national networks, smart cities/infrastructure, satellite networks... or somewhere else?
• Tensions within the US, and between US and Europe over the role and dominance of "Big Tech". Personal data, monopoly behaviour, censorship or regional sovereignty etc. This mostly doesn't touch networks today, but maybe cloud-native will draw attention.
• Semiconductor supply-chain challenges and the geopolitical fragility of Taiwan's chip-fabrication sector.
• How telecoms (and cloud) fits within Net Zero strategies, either as a consumer of energy, or as an enabler of green solutions.
• Cyber threats from nation-state actors, criminal cartels and terrorist-linked groups - especially aimed at critical infrastructure and health/government/finance systems.

In other words, there's a lot going on. It will impact 5G, 6G development, vendor landscapes, cloud - and also other areas such as spectrum policy and Internet governance.

Network diversity as a focus

I've written and spoken before about the importance of "network diversity" and the dangers of technology monocultures, including over-reliance on particular standards (eg 5G) or particular business models (eg national MNOs) as some sort of universal platform. It is now clear that it is more important than ever.

The analogy I made with agriculture, or ecological biodiversity, is proving to be robust.

(Previous work includes this article from 2020 about private enterprise networks, or my 2017 presentation keynote on future disruptions, at Ofcom's spectrum conference. (The blue/yellow image of wheat fields, repeated here in this post, was chosen long before it became so resonant as the Ukrainian flag). I've also covered the shift towards Open RAN and telecoms supplier diversification – including a long report I submitted to the UK Government's Diversification Task Force last year - see this post and download the report).

A key takeout from my Open RAN report was that demand diversity is as important as creating more supply choices in a given product domain. Having many classes of network operator and owner – for instance national MNOs, enterprise private 4G/5G, towercos, industrial MNOs and neutral hosts – tends to pull through multiple options for supply in terms of both vendor diversity and technology diversity. They have different requirements, different investment criteria and different operational models.

In Ukraine, the "demands" for connectivity are arising from an even more broad set of sources, including improvised communications for refugees, drones and military personnel.

The war in Ukraine & telecoms

There have been numerous articles published which highlight the surprising resilience and importance of Ukrainian telecoms during the war so far. Bringing together and synthesising multiple sources, this has highlighted a number of important issues around network connectivity:

• The original “survivability” concept of IP networks seems to have been demonstrated convincingly. Whether used for ISPs’ Internet access, or internal backhaul and transport for public fixed and mobile networks, the ability for diverse and resilient routing paths seems to have mostly been successful.
• Public national mobile networks - mostly 4G in Ukraine's case - have proven essential in many ways, whether that has been for reporting information about enemy combatants' locations and activities, obtaining advice from government authorities, or dealing with the evacuation as refugees. (I'm not sure if subway stations used as shelters have underground cellular coverage, or if there is WiFi). Authorities also seem to have had success in getting citizens to self-censor, to avoid disclosing sensitive details to their enemies.
• Reportedly the Russian forces haven't generally targeted telecoms infrastructure on a widescale basis. This was partly because they have been using commerical mobile networks themselves. However, because roaming was disabled, Russian military use of their encrypted handsets and SIMs on public 3G/4G networks seems to have failed. Two articles here and here give good insight, and also suggests there may be network surveillance backdoors which Russia may have exploited. There have also been reports of stingrays ("fake" base stations used for interception of calls / identity) being deployed. It also appears that some towns and cities - notably the destroyed city of Mariupol - have been mostly knocked offline, partly because the electrical grid was attacked first.
• Ukraine’s competitive telecoms market has probably helped its resilience. There is a highly fragmented fixed ISP landscape, with very inexpensive connections. There are over a dozen public peering-points across the country. There are three main MNOs, with many users having SIMs from 2+ operators. (This is a good overview article - https://ukraineworld.org/articles/ukraine-explained/key-facts-about-ukraines-telecom-industry). It seems they have enabled some form of national roaming to allow subscribers to attach to each others' networks.
• WiFi hotspots (likely with mobile backhaul) have been used by NGOs evacuating refugees by buses.
• Although it is still only being used at a small scale, the LEO satellite terminals from SpaceX’s StarLink seem to be an important contributor to connectivity – not least as a backup option. Realistically, satellite isn’t appropriate for millions of individual homes – and especially not personal vehicles and smartphones – but is an important part of the overall network-diversity landscape. Various commentators have suggested it is useful as a backup for critical infrastructure connectivity, as well as for mobile units such as special forces.
• Another satellite broadband provider, Viasat, apparently suffered a cyberattack at the start of the war (link here), which knocked various modem users offline (or even "bricked" the devies), reportedly including Ukrainian government organisations. Investigations haven't officially named Russia, but a coincidence seems improbable. This attack also impacted users outside Ukraine.
• Various peer-to-peer apps using Bluetooth or WiFi allow direct connections between phones, even if wide area connections are down (see link)
• There have been some concerning reports about the impact of GPS jammers on the operation of cellular networks, which may use it as a source of “timing synchronisation” to operate properly, especially for TDD radio bands. While this has long been a risk for individual cell-sites from low-power transmitters, the use of deliberate electronic warfare tools could potentially point to broader vulnerabilities in future.
• There has been wide use of commercial drones like the DJI Mavic-3 for surveillance (video and thermal imaging), or modified to deliver improvised weaponry. These use WiFi to connect to controllers on the ground, as well as a proprietary video transmission protocols (called O3+) which apparently has range of up to 15km using unlicensed spectrum. Some of the "Aerorozvidka" units reportedly then use StarLink terminals to connect back to command sites to coordinate artillery attacks (link).

In short, it seems that Ukraine has been well served by having lots of connectivity options - probably including some additional military systems that aren't widely discussed. It has benefited from multiple fixed, cellular and satellite networks, with potential for interconnect, plus inventive "quick fixes" after failures and collaboration between providers. It is exploiting licensed and unlicensed spectrum, with cellular, Wi-Fi and other technologies.

In other words, network diversity is working properly. There appears to be no single point of failure, despite deliberate attacks by invading forces and hackers. Connectivity is far from perfect, but it has held up remarkably well. Perhaps the full range of electronic warfare options hasn't been used - but given the geographical size of Ukraine and the inability of Russia forces to maintain supply-lines to distant units, that is also unsurprising.

Another set of issues that I haven't really examined are around connectivity within sanctions-hit Russia. Maybe it will have to develop more local network equipment manufacturers - if they can get the necessary silicon and other components. It probably will not wish to over-rely on Huawei & ZTE any more than some Western countries have been happy with Nokia and Ericsson as primary options. More problematic may be fixed-Internet routers, servers, WiFi APs and other Western-dominated products. I can't say I'm sympathetic, and I certainly don't want to offer suggestions. Let's see what happens.

Recommendations for policymakers, industry bodies and regulators

So what are the implications of all this? Hopefully, few other countries face a similar invasion by a large and hostile army. But preparedness is wise, especially for countries with unfriendly neighbours and territorial disputes. And even for everywhere else, the risks of cyberattacks, terrorism, natural disasters - or even just software bugs or human error - are still significant.

I should stress that I'm not a cybersecurity or critical infrastructure specialist. But I can read across from other trends I'm seeing in telecoms, and in particular I'm doing a lot of work on "path dependency" where small, innocent-seeming actions end up having long-term strategic impacts and can lock-in technology trajectories.

My initial set of considerations and recommendations:

• As a general principle, divergence in technology should be considered at least as positively than convergence. It maintains optionality, fosters innovation and reduces single-point-of-failure risks.
• National networks and telcos (fixed and mobile) are essential - but cannot do everything. They also need to cooperate during emergencies - a spirit of collaboration which seems to have worked well during the pandemic in many countries.
• Normal ideas about cyber-resilience and security may not extend to the impact of full-scale military electronic warfare units, as well as more "typical" online hacking and malware attacks.
• Having separate "air-gapped" networks available makes sense not just for critical communications (military, utilities etc) but for more general use. It isn't inefficient - it's insurance. There may be implications here for network-sharing in some instances.
• Thought needs to be given to emergency fallbacks and improvised work-arounds, for instance in the event of mass power outages or sabotage. This is particularly important for software/cloud-based networks, which may be less "fixable" in the field. Can a 5G network be "bodged"? (that's "MacGyvred" to my US friends)? As a sidenote - how have electric vehicles fared in Ukraine?
• Unlicensed spectrum and "permissionless communications" is hugely important during emergency situations. Yes, it doesn't have control or lawful intercept. But that's entirely acceptable in extreme circumstances.
• Linkages between technologies, access networks and control/identity planes should generally be via gateways that can be closed, controlled or removed if necessary. If one is attacked, the rest should be firewalled off from it. For the same reason "seamless" should be a red-flag word for cross-tech / cross-network roaming. Seams are important. They offer control and the ability to partition if necessary. "Frictionless" is OK, as long as friction can be re-imposed if needed.
• Governments should be extremely cautious of telcos extending 3GPP control mechanisms – especially the core network and slicing – to fixed broadband infrastructure. Fixed broadband is absolutely critical, and complex software dependencies may trade off fine-grained control vs. resilience - and offer additional threat surfaces.
• Democratising and improving satellite communications looks like an ever more wise move, for all sorts of reasons. It's not a panacea, but it's certainly "air-gapped" as above. 3GPP-based "non-terrestrial" networks, eg based on drones or balloons, also has potential - but will ideally be able to work independently of terrestrial networks if needed.
• I haven't heard much about LPWAN and LoRa-type networks, but I can imagine that being useful in emergency situations too.
• Sanctions, trade wars and supply-chain issues are highly unpredictable in terms of intended and unintended consequences. Technology diversity helps mitigate this, alongside supplier diversity in any one network domain.
• Spectrum policy should enable enough scale economies to ensure good supply of products (and viability of providers), but not *so* much scale that any one option drives out alternatives.
• The role and impact of international bodies like ITU, GSMA and 3GPP needs careful scrutiny. We are likely to see them become even more political in future. If necessary, there may have to be separate "non-authoritarian" and "authoritarian" versions of some standards (and spectrum policies). De-coupling and de-layering technologies' interdependency - especially radio and core networks - could isolate "disagreements" in certain layers, without undermining the whole international collaboration.
• There should be a rudimentary basic minimum level of connectivity that uses "old" products and standards. Maybe we need to keep a small slice of 900MHz spectrum alive for generator-powered GSM cells and a box of cheap phones in bunkers - essentially a future variant of Ham Radio.

So to wrap up, I'm ever more convinced that Network Diversity is essential. Not only does it foster innovation, and limit oligopoly risk, but it also enables more options in tragic circumstances. We should also consider the potential risks of too much sophistication and pursuit of effiency and performance at all costs. What happens when things break (or get deliberately broken)?

In the meantime, I'm hoping for a quick resolution to this awful war. Slava Ukraini!

Sidenote: I am currently researching the areas of “technology lock-in” and “path dependence”. In particular, I have been investigating the various mechanisms by which lock-in occurs and strategies for spotting its incipience, or breaking out of it. Please get in touch with me, if this is an area of interest for you.

A rant about 5G myths - chasing unicorns​

Exasperated rant & myth-busting time.

I actually got asked by a non-tech journalist recently "will 5G change our lives?"

Quick answer: No. Emphatically No.

#5G is Just Another G. It's not a unicorn

Yes, 5G is an important upgrade. But it's also *massively* overhyped by the mobile industry, by technology vendors, by some in government, and by many business and technology journalists.

- There is no "race to 5G". That's meaningless geopolitical waffle. Network operators are commercial organisations and will deploy networks when they see a viable market, or get cajoled into it by the terms & timing of spectrum licenses.

- Current 5G is like 4G, but faster & with extra capacity. Useful, but not world-changing.

- Future 5G will mean better industrial systems and certain other cool (but niche) use-cases.

- Most 5G networks will be very patchy, without ubiquitous coverage, except for very rudimentary performance. That means 5G-only applications will be rare - developers will have to assume 4G fallback (& WiFi) are common, and that dead-spots still exist.

- Lots of things get called 5G, but actually aren't 5G. It's become a sort of meaningless buzzword for "cool new wireless stuff", often by people who couldn't describe the difference between 5G, 4G or a pigeon carrying a message.

- Anyone who talks about 5G being essential for autonomous cars or remote surgery is clueless. 5G might get used in connected vehicles (self-driving or otherwise) if it's available and cheap, but it won't be essential - not least as it won't work everywhere (see above).

- Yes, there will be a bit more fixed wireless FWA broadband with 5G. But no, it's not replacing fibre or cable for normal users, especially in competitive urban markets. It'll help take FWA from 5% to 10-12% of global home broadband lines.

- The fact the 5G core is "a cloud-native service based architecture" doesn't make it world-changing. It's like raving about a software-defined heating element for your toaster. Fantastic for internal flexibility. But we expect that of anything new, really. It doesn't magically turn a mobile network into a "platform". Nor does it mean it's not Just Another G.

- No, enterprises are not going to "buy a network slice". The amount of #SliceWash I'm hearing is astonishing. It's a way to create some rudimentary virtualised sub-networks in 5G, but it's not a magic configurator for 100s or 1000s of fine-grained, dynamically-adjusted different permutations all coexisting in harmony. The delusional vision is very far removed from the mundane reality.

- The more interesting stuff in 5G happens in Phase 2/3, when 3GPP Release 16 & then Release 17 are complete, commercialised & common. R16 has just been finalised. From 2023-4 onward we should expect some more massmarket cool stuff, especially for industrial use. Assuming the economy recovers by then, that is.

- Ultra-reliable low-latency communications (URLLC) sounds great, but it's unclear there's a business case except at very localised levels, mostly for private networks. Actually, UR and LL are two separate things anyway. MNOs aren't going to be able sell reliability unless they also take legal *liability* if things go wrong. If the robot's network goes down and it injures a worker, is the telco CEO going to take the rap in court?

- Getting high-performance 5G working indoors will be very hard, need dedicated systems, and will take lots of time, money and trained engineers. It'll be a decade or longer before it's very common in public buildings - especially if it has to support mmWave and URLLC. Most things like AR/VR will just use Wi-Fi. Enterprises may deploy 5G in factories or airport hangars or mines - but will engineer it very carefully, examine the ROI - and possibly work with a specialist provider rather than a telco.

- #mmWave 5G is even more overhyped than most aspects. Yes, there's tons of spectrum and in certain circumstances it'll have huge speed and capacity. But it's go short range and needs line-of-sight. Outdoor-to-indoor coverage will be near zero. Having your back to a cell-site won't help. It will struggle to go through double-glazed windows, the shell of a car or train, and maybe even your bag or pocket. Extenders & repeaters will help, but it's going to be exceptionally patchy (and need tons of fibre everywhere for backhaul).

- 5G + #edgecomputing is a not going to be a big deal. If low-latency connections were that important, we'd have had localised *fixed* edge computing a decade ago, as most important enterprise sites connect with fibre. There's almost no FEC, so MEC seems implausible except for niches. And even there, not much will happen until there's edge federation & interconnect in place. Also, most smartphone-type devices will connect to someone else's WiFi between 50-80% of the time, and may have a VPN which means the network "egress" is a long way from the obvious geographically-proximal edge.

- Yes, enterprise is more important in 5G. But only for certain uses. A lot can be done with 4G. "Verticals" is a meaningless term; think about applications.

- No, it won't displace Wi-Fi. Obviously. I've been through this multiple times.

- No, all laptops won't have 5G. (As with 3G and 4G. Same arguments).

- No, 5G won't singlehandedly contribute $trillions to GDP. It's a less-important innovation area than many other things, such as AI, biotech, cloud, solar and probably quantum computing and nuclear fusion. So unless you think all of those will generate 10's or 100's of $trillions, you've got the zeros wrong.

- No, 5G won't fry your brain, or kill birds, or give you a virus. Conspiracy theorists are as bad as the hypesters. 5G is neither Devil nor Deity. It's just an important, but ultimately rather boring, upgrade.

There's probably a ton more 5G fallacies I've forgotten, and I might edit this with a few extra ones if they occur to me. Feel free to post comments here, although the majority of debate is on my LinkedIn version of this post (here). This is also the inaugural post for a new LinkedIn newsletter, Most of my stuff is not quite this snarky, but it depends on my mood. I'm @disruptivedean on Twitter so follow me there too.

If you like my work, and either need a (more sober) business advisory session or workshop, let me know. I'm also a frequent speaker, panellist and moderator for real and virtual events.

Just remember: #5GJAG. Just Another G.

Mobile standards may fragment again, driven by geopolitics

I think we might see a return to the old days of multiple competing mobile standards.

But rather than the US/Europe technical war of 2G/3G over the nuances of GSM & CDMA, this time I see a scenario driven more by US/China geopolitics and ideology, enabled by various technology catalysts.

[This is an extended and more nuanced version of a post of mine on LinkedIn - link, which I edited to fit the 1300chrs limit. It's worth looking at the discussion in the comments there]

The past: how LTE and 5G became global standards

To understand how we got here, and why we might diverge in future, we need to look at the past. Historically, there were two main competing camps for 2G and 3G networks:

• GSM/UMTS, championed by 3GPP and Europe-centric players such as Ericsson, Nokia and major European operator groups such as Vodafone & Telefonica.
• CDMA, driven by US companies, especially Qualcomm and Verizon, plus also Sprint, Lucent, Nortel and others, organised via 3GPP2

Back around 2006-7, when 4G was being designed and specified, a number of options were proposed:

• LTE was the 3GPP's option
• UMB was the CDMA/3GPP2 approach, leaning heavily on Qualcomm's acquisition of Flarion, which was developing an IEEE 802.20 wireless system.
• WiMAX, which came from vendors with a Wi-Fi background, notably Intel. That was an IEEE technology too - 802.16.

For various reasons, LTE won, and the others disappeared. (I wrote plenty about this at the time, if you want to go through my archived posts, such as here and here). 

IEEE still technologies dominate in local networks such as Wi-Fi and "personal area networks" such as Bluetooth, but for wide-area mobile, the 3GPP dynasty rules supreme.

But there's a back-story to LTE's success, and its rise as the single global standard for 4G.

In the 3G era, it wasn't just UMTS vs. CDMA2000, but also the Chinese TD-SCDMA standard. (& minor proprietary techs, such as Nextel's & Motorola's iDEN)

TD-SCDMA never gained traction outside China's domestic market, but it helped build the local industry to scale and then evolved into TD-LTE for 4G, which was folded in as part of the global LTE story.

The world's mobile-dedicated spectrum comes in two varieties - FDD (frequency-division duplexing) which uses separate 'paired' bands for uplink and downlink, and TDD (time-division duplexing) which uses a single 'unpaired' band, alternating between up/down slices of time. 2G and 3G were dominated by FDD radios. The inclusion of TD-LTE enabled 4G to access both categories. (WiMAX was TDD-only, a major failing).

The Europe+China combination made 3GPP / LTE unstoppable, especially given the extra scale in terms of both market size and spectrum it enabled. It also cemented Huawei's role as a powerhouse, and partly led to Alcatel's acquisition by Nokia and Nortel's cellular business by Ericsson. Qualcomm's conversion to the LTE cause helped too.  

In parallel to the radio, the 4G cellular core network (EPC) also rose in perceived importance compared to 2G/3G eras, as it allowed MNOs much greater control over data flows. It also allowed vendors easier lock-in.

For the last 11 years, the mobile industry has exploded, partly because of LTE's ubiquity and scale economies, and partly because of the simultaneous rise of the iPhone and Android. It's worth noting that 3GPP's original vision for 3G and 4G didn't see access to the "public Internet" as a core part of the service, although it now dominates usage and value.

In recent years, we have seen the 3GPP "global standard" continue to evolve to 5G, with Huawei, Nokia, Ericsson, Qualcomm dominating the landscape again, plus Samsung and a few others following behind them. At the moment, most 5G is "non-standalone", using the existing 4G cores - and thus again locking-in the established vendors, and the existing powerful core and exclusive national-licence philosophy favouring traditional large MNOs.

However, the 5G vision of many of the industry "old guard" is still centres on the them vs. us approach to network control and "native" (ie telco-delivered) services. There's still the almost-bigoted rhetoric and lobbying about so-called "OTTs" (an obsolete and self-damaging term, in my view), and the attempt to dilute - or at least monitor - the user's desire & ability to access open Internet applications and even connect independently via Wi-Fi.

___________________________________________________________

But now, I see clouds gathering - or new rays of sunshine, depending on your perspective.

I think that geopolitics may undermine the "single global standard" for mobile, along with some conveniently-timed technical evolution paths. This is not a forecast, or even the most likely outcome - but I believe it is solidifying into a much more realistic scenario.

For the later stages of 5G (from Release 17 onwards), and then beyond that with the evolution of 6G, I think the US might be about to diverge from the last decade's consensus.

The Sino-US politics were already stark, even before the COVID19 pandemic added more fuel to the fire. We have already seen massive pressure with regard to Huawei, not just in North America but across Europe and other OECD countries such as Japan and Australia. The US has previously taken action against ZTE as well, and more recently has started even discouraging interconnection with Chinese telcos (link). 

Apparently, the US tech industry is now being pushed/advised to avoid working with China, even on standards development (see this Economist article, although it may be behind a paywall for some - link). That potentially weakens US influence at 3GPP, and could prompt it to seek alternative paths forward. We can expect the US Presidential campaign to focus on this theme as well, over the next 6 months - although both major US political parties have been fairly unified on the ongoing trade disputes with China.

There are also some signs of tougher views in Europe. Even though the UK and EU have allowed continued limited engagement with Huawei, the politics is still hardening, especially in the wake of the virus' trajectory (link).

But this is not just about geopolitics. It is also about technology "philosophy". I see something of a divide here, too. In a way, it's a modern-day version of the Bellheads vs. Netheads battle of the past (link):

• Control: On one side is a vision of mobile world with strong vendor / MNO / national control, evolved from today's 3GPP & GSMA vision. This has
• Strong policy control - and eventually network-slicing - delivered from a powerful core network. 
• Deep reach down into devices, from SIMs to connectivity management, and perhaps surveillance options. 
• A big focus on optimised & automated infrastructure, which probably favours single-vendor (or at least big-vendor) approaches. 
• An expectation of exclusive national spectrum licenses, with limited scope for local or enterprise networks which do not also lean on MNOs' services. 
• There's also a lot of work aimed at reinventing TCP/IP in ways that give telcos more control, as well. 
• Edge-computing is integrated into the telco domain as much as possible, and delivered as part of a "slice" or MNO service.
• Openness:The other world vision has a more open / Internet-centric approach. It's more "permissionless" with vendor or even operator lock-ins of any sort being anathema. There's:
• Less core-network control, favouring local breakout & device-led multiple connections, without the MNO (or government) having a panopticon view of traffic. 
• An emerging focus on disaggregated & open RAN models (O-RAN, TIP, OpenRAN etc), favouring multivendor- and IT/cloud -centric architectures. 
• An expectation of Wi-Fi indoors, often owned and controlled by a non-MNO. 
• Growing availability of more-open spectrum with dynamic / local licenses, as well as traditional exclusive bands as a foundation. 
• Edge computing is primarily an enabler of telecom networks, not delivered by them - and the expectation is that most will be neutral or independent, in local 3rd-party datacentres/modules or on enterprise premises.
  

In a way, this is almost a 3GPP vs. IEEE/IETF divide, but just as politics has shifted from a left/right axis to open/closed, perhaps something similar is happening here too.

It's not clear that the wireless world will cleave cleanly along this divide, especially in the near future as 5G is still being deployed. AT&T and Verizon will not be happy relinquishing control-points, either. So today, we have some fairly messy - and maybe unworkable - hybrids. There's lots of talk about opening APIs for enterprises to configure their own 5G slices. We have some grudging approaches to blending cellular and Wi-Fi, and various moves to enable "non-public networks" for enterprise in Release 16 & 17 of the 5G standards. But even that phrasing is awkward and somewhat derisive - as is the term "non-trusted" to describe other access networks.

But the technology forces are clear, even beyond the politics. In the last year or so we have seen:

• CBRS launching, with dynamic spectrum and a focus on new use-cases and business models, especially enterprise/local networks. It is catalysing a new vendor ecosystem of small cell suppliers, cloud EPCs and specialised SPs and integrators.
• Huge interest in local/private spectrum and networks in Germany, UK, Japan and elsewhere
• Rakuten, Dish and other operators validating the vRAN model and working with new US-centric vendors like Altiostar and Mavenir. (Rakuten is, like Softbank, an Internet company diversifying into cellular. Dish isn't "old school" mobile, either, but a satellite TV provider).
• Huge upswing of presence of IT/cloud players in cellular infrastructure, including acquisitions. IBM/RedHat, Dell/VMware, Microsoft/Affirmed, HPE, Oracle - plus AWS and Google taking various roles from RAN to core, as well as Facebook with TIP and its new stake in Reliance Jio
• A massive tranche of 6GHz spectrum being made available on an unlicensed basis in the US, primarily for Wi-Fi6E, but also maybe 5G variants in future as well. This has further killed off the (already implausible) idea that cellular-based LANs might edge out Wi-Fi
• Fragmentation of the EPC / 5G Core marketplace, with low-cost / cloud-based / programmable / "light" variants that look like a normal piece of the IT stack, rather than arcane telco wizardry. (I wonder if we'll see "core-optional" mobile networks - but that's for another post).
• More interest in mmWave in the US and South Korea, including for indoor use.
• FCC and the White House have taken a close interest in 5G and next-gen wireless, and seem keen to foster a local technology ecosystem for mobile (link)
• Innovation in satellite constellations such as SpaceX's Starlink
• Plenty of other big US-centric technology players watching closely, such as Cisco, Juniper and of course Apple.
• (I know there's also various moves around evolving TCP/IP, but I haven't had a chance to get my head around them yet).

We might still see 5.5G and 6G world emerge as an elegant hyper-converged version of these two philosophies. And we'll certainly see firms such as Ericsson and Huawei try to continue the 3GPP/control vision, while also exploring the opportunities and tools from the other side. Neither seems especially happy with the rise of local/private spectrum or pure-play enterprise and neutral-host providers. It's easier to sell direct to 100s of MNOs, than 10000s of enterprises via a myriad of new channels and integrators.
 
I'm also interested to see what happens with ownership of Nokia (which seems a bit more open to the new realities) given its financial woes - and also how the European governments and regulators act. Is Europe a bridge between the two worlds, or does it fall in the gap? 

In many ways, I see the EU model lean more towards MNO control, with governments happier to focus regulation on competition at commercial levels, rather than technical - it tends to push harmonisation heavily, as a consequence of its previous success with GSM which catalysed the whole sector. There is more wiggle-room around enterprise and local spectrum licensing, given the strong lobbies for manufacturing and other industrial sectors., plus more emphasis on privacy.

I can imagine Japan aligning more with the US vision, but South Korea in a similar position to Europe. A year ago, Samsung was the obvious beneficiary of Huawei's problems. Now, it's probably the OpenRAN ecosystem that's the effective #3 choice.

At the moment, I'd rate the chances of a more-serious and clearer split at 30% and rising. It won't happen overnight - I think that Release 17 is probably the trigger-point. By the time we get to 2030 and 6G though, I wouldn't be surprised to see a revival of something that looks like 3GPP2, or perhaps (whisper it, as many will cringe) WiMAX2. At the very least, it will be more Internet-flavoured.

If the "old guard" vendors and their institutional peers within 3GPP, GSMA, ETSI etc. want to avoid this bifurcation, they are going to have to make some difficult decisions, and soon. Otherwise the potential to be disrupted from adjacency will grow. They need to be genuinely open, and start loosening the vision of pure "end-to-end control", and embracing imperfect, inelegant pragmatism about network design, operation and ownership. Exactly how that fits with the worsening geopolitical landscape is a problem I'll leave for the diplomats and spin-doctors.

Note: If you are interested in understanding more about this scenario, or are looking for an analyst or advisor to help formulate strategy in the wireless technology space, please get in touch with me. I can be reached via LinkedIn, @disruptivedean on Twitter, or via information at disruptive-analysis dot com.

From pixabay.com