Question:
Of a given group of friends / associates, what is the probability that they will either:
a) Share the same mobile operator
b) Share the same mobile device / OS
c) Share the same Internet social network
d) Share the same interoperable multi-operator / multi-device client & service?
Monday, June 07, 2010
Upcoming events
I'm going to be at the following events over the next few weeks. Please let me know if you want an informal meeting or introduction, either as a potential clients of Disruptive Analysis, or as a quick analyst briefing.
8/9th June - IIR In-Building Summit, London (speaking about data traffic & impact on in-building coverage and capacity)
15/16th June - TEN Telecoms Executive Network, London (moderating panel on mobile broadband)
23/24 June - Avren Femtocell event & Femto Forum Awards Dinner, London
I can be reached via information AT disruptive-analysis DOT com
8/9th June - IIR In-Building Summit, London (speaking about data traffic & impact on in-building coverage and capacity)
15/16th June - TEN Telecoms Executive Network, London (moderating panel on mobile broadband)
23/24 June - Avren Femtocell event & Femto Forum Awards Dinner, London
I can be reached via information AT disruptive-analysis DOT com
Thursday, June 03, 2010
New Cisco VNI traffic report out
One of the broadband industry's "bibles" has been published in a 2010 edition.
Cisco's "Visual Networking Index" predictions of fixed and mobile data traffic are some of the most widely-cited charts and qualitative predictions in the industry.
I'll go through it with a fine-toothed comb when I get a chance, but one thing sticks out immediately:
2014 = 63.9 Exabytes / month total IP traffic
... of which 3.5 Exabytes / month is mobile data (ie 5.5%)
What is not clear to me at first sight is what happens to femtocell and WiFi offloaded traffic - ie is it double-counted? Especially femto traffic, which is likely to traverse two sets of routers first in the fixed ISP's network, and then again in the mobile operator's own core.
(I'm assuming that the figures exclude double-counting "private IP" traffic, such as transport between cell sites and RNCs and the operator core, where provided via a 3rd-party wholesale network operator)
Cisco's "Visual Networking Index" predictions of fixed and mobile data traffic are some of the most widely-cited charts and qualitative predictions in the industry.
I'll go through it with a fine-toothed comb when I get a chance, but one thing sticks out immediately:
2014 = 63.9 Exabytes / month total IP traffic
... of which 3.5 Exabytes / month is mobile data (ie 5.5%)
What is not clear to me at first sight is what happens to femtocell and WiFi offloaded traffic - ie is it double-counted? Especially femto traffic, which is likely to traverse two sets of routers first in the fixed ISP's network, and then again in the mobile operator's own core.
(I'm assuming that the figures exclude double-counting "private IP" traffic, such as transport between cell sites and RNCs and the operator core, where provided via a 3rd-party wholesale network operator)
NEW Mobile Broadband Traffic Management Paper
Optimised Internet apps. vs. RCS vs. multi-headed clients
OCT 11 2010 NEW REPORT AND BLOG POST ON RCS HERE
I'm currently digging into IMS/RCS for what may turn into an "epitaph" research paper. My current spoken and blogged views on it are well-known, but I feel it is worthy of a more weighty and analytical piece.
I'm currently sifting through assorted vendors' websites, GSMA RCS specs, YouTube video demos and so forth.
I'm struck by one very clear question:
On a half-decent phone, why would anyone want to use a multi-headed / aggregated app, hooked into various social networks and messaging services, rather than an optimised one from the underlying Internet service?
For example: The chance that an operator/RCS-mediated "Facebook experience" is ever going to be better than a native app or browser-based "Facebook experience" is surely zero, isn't it? Or am I missing something? Is the operator-based option solely for low-end devices that can't support proper apps?
Surely, the day a web-based service updates its capabilities with something cool and new (say, a "dislike" button, or innovative photo-upload feature), it can update both its browser and app-based interfaces. But it's stuck with whatever the current device client can support for the operator-mediated version.
I can perhaps see the value of importing some operator data and capabilities (eg presence, billing) inside the Facebook app - but I really struggle to see the rationale for doing things vice versa.
The way I see it, social networks become (relatively) more important through two main routes:
1) Viral adoption of standalone clients or web access because of some unique & desirable features to a specific user community
2) Piggybacking on another successful social network as a platform, and then spinning out to standalone once reaching critical mass
So... what is the "vector" for an operator-based social networking service to become widely adopted? Is there a catalyst for "virality"? Is the fundamental desire for that virality being embedded in RCS's design criteria and specifications? At the moment, I see it as being engineering-led, with little regard for basic behavioural psychology.
I'd contend that for innovative mobile applications to become successful, virality is more important than interoperability. (And then there's openness / extensibility, but that's a whole other story).
I'm currently digging into IMS/RCS for what may turn into an "epitaph" research paper. My current spoken and blogged views on it are well-known, but I feel it is worthy of a more weighty and analytical piece.
I'm currently sifting through assorted vendors' websites, GSMA RCS specs, YouTube video demos and so forth.
I'm struck by one very clear question:
On a half-decent phone, why would anyone want to use a multi-headed / aggregated app, hooked into various social networks and messaging services, rather than an optimised one from the underlying Internet service?
For example: The chance that an operator/RCS-mediated "Facebook experience" is ever going to be better than a native app or browser-based "Facebook experience" is surely zero, isn't it? Or am I missing something? Is the operator-based option solely for low-end devices that can't support proper apps?
Surely, the day a web-based service updates its capabilities with something cool and new (say, a "dislike" button, or innovative photo-upload feature), it can update both its browser and app-based interfaces. But it's stuck with whatever the current device client can support for the operator-mediated version.
I can perhaps see the value of importing some operator data and capabilities (eg presence, billing) inside the Facebook app - but I really struggle to see the rationale for doing things vice versa.
The way I see it, social networks become (relatively) more important through two main routes:
1) Viral adoption of standalone clients or web access because of some unique & desirable features to a specific user community
2) Piggybacking on another successful social network as a platform, and then spinning out to standalone once reaching critical mass
So... what is the "vector" for an operator-based social networking service to become widely adopted? Is there a catalyst for "virality"? Is the fundamental desire for that virality being embedded in RCS's design criteria and specifications? At the moment, I see it as being engineering-led, with little regard for basic behavioural psychology.
I'd contend that for innovative mobile applications to become successful, virality is more important than interoperability. (And then there's openness / extensibility, but that's a whole other story).
Wednesday, June 02, 2010
AT&T tiering, femtocells and holistic traffic management
AT&T has finally seen the light and recognised that "true unlimited" mobile data plans are unrealistic, moving instead to tiered offerings. Most of the rest of the world outside the US has long had tiered / capped services for both smartphones and laptop modems, so this starts to bring North America in line with practices elsewhere.
However, I'm not too convinced by the details. It's 200MB/month for $15, or 2GB/month for $25, plus additional overage charges of $15 for 200MB or $10 for 1GB on the respective plans.
The 200MB / 2GB looks too much like a cynical "Goldilocks" fee structure to me. Too Little, or Too Much. But not "Just Right". A good proportion of smartphone users have monthly usage in the general range 200-500MB - as indicated by AT&T's rather disingenuous comment that "currently, 65 percent of AT&T smartphone customers use less than 200 MB of data per month on average."
Let's think about that last statement. Firstly, we know that some smartphone users - notably corporate BlackBerry users - are relatively low-usage, and bring down the average. And they will be on separate BlackBerry / corporate plans anyway. Secondly, that means that if they use <200MB *on average* then it is likely that there will be variation about that average. In other words, a good proportion who are (say) hovering between 150-250MB/month will incur overage fees on a regular basis, assuming no "rollover" of unused allowances.
The other standout is the pricing of the packages is decidely non-linear. If the incremental cost of 1GB of data is given as $10, then that then points to a single-digit $ base cost per GB. So the overage charge on the 200MB package is clearly being made at an astonishing mark-up.
The clear message is that "normal" consumers are being pointed towards the $25 plan, with only exceptionally low-end smartphone users benefiting from the low-rate option.
The other detail missing from the press release is the apparent fact that femtocell traffic ("Microcell" in AT&T parlance) is *included* in counting towards the quota, but WiFi traffic is *excluded*.
[Hat-tip to competitor / peer Peter Jarich via Twitter for the Microcell anecdote. However, please note that I haven't been able to source this independently, so what follow may need to be edited if AT&T issues a contrary clarification]
This goes to the heart of some of themes in my recent research paper on Mobile Traffic Management, and the need for holistic thinking within operators. Given that the RAN generally costs much more than the core network for most operators, there should clearly be differential (or zero-rated) pricing for traffic using femtocell offload. Either that, or there should be a mechanism for customers to charge AT&T for using THE USER'S broadband pipes for backhaul.
It is critical that any policy management and charging infrastruture is capable of discerning bearer type (which could also be UMA WiFi tunneled via the core on some other networks). Otherwise it makes a total mockery of the concept that policy is intended to align pricing with the underlying costs of service delivery.
It also makes a mockery of the femtocell concept as a mass proposition, if the end-user has to pay more than using their own WiFi. If I was a femto vendor today, I'd be spitting feathers about this, as it completely undermines the positioning vs. WiFi as an offload tool.
I also know that many vendors claim it is feasible to distinguish between femto and macro traffic in their DPI / policy products because I've been asking this specific question to many of them the last month or so. And let's face it, it's pretty obvious if traffic is coming through the carrier's femto gateway - if the operator can be bothered to do the integration, and has a rating/charging system up to the job of differentiating it on the quota and bill.
My guess is that the RAN offload/femto project at AT&T has been disconnected from the tiering/policy initiative. This is not the first example of one isolated aspect of traffic management being disconnected from others. Nor will it likely be the last, given the proliferation of techniques and technologies being deployed. Many will have unfortunate side-effects and unintended consequences - as I discussed regarding video compression / optimisation recently.
It's possible that AT&T recognises the issue and will fix it in time - but at the very least it ought to recognise the issue explicitly.
If you want to know more about the range of mobile broadband traffic management options - and the need for a holistic approach to avoid outcomes like this, you need to read my recent research paper. Details are here, and it's priced from just $350.
However, I'm not too convinced by the details. It's 200MB/month for $15, or 2GB/month for $25, plus additional overage charges of $15 for 200MB or $10 for 1GB on the respective plans.
The 200MB / 2GB looks too much like a cynical "Goldilocks" fee structure to me. Too Little, or Too Much. But not "Just Right". A good proportion of smartphone users have monthly usage in the general range 200-500MB - as indicated by AT&T's rather disingenuous comment that "currently, 65 percent of AT&T smartphone customers use less than 200 MB of data per month on average."
Let's think about that last statement. Firstly, we know that some smartphone users - notably corporate BlackBerry users - are relatively low-usage, and bring down the average. And they will be on separate BlackBerry / corporate plans anyway. Secondly, that means that if they use <200MB *on average* then it is likely that there will be variation about that average. In other words, a good proportion who are (say) hovering between 150-250MB/month will incur overage fees on a regular basis, assuming no "rollover" of unused allowances.
The other standout is the pricing of the packages is decidely non-linear. If the incremental cost of 1GB of data is given as $10, then that then points to a single-digit $ base cost per GB. So the overage charge on the 200MB package is clearly being made at an astonishing mark-up.
The clear message is that "normal" consumers are being pointed towards the $25 plan, with only exceptionally low-end smartphone users benefiting from the low-rate option.
The other detail missing from the press release is the apparent fact that femtocell traffic ("Microcell" in AT&T parlance) is *included* in counting towards the quota, but WiFi traffic is *excluded*.
[Hat-tip to competitor / peer Peter Jarich via Twitter for the Microcell anecdote. However, please note that I haven't been able to source this independently, so what follow may need to be edited if AT&T issues a contrary clarification]
This goes to the heart of some of themes in my recent research paper on Mobile Traffic Management, and the need for holistic thinking within operators. Given that the RAN generally costs much more than the core network for most operators, there should clearly be differential (or zero-rated) pricing for traffic using femtocell offload. Either that, or there should be a mechanism for customers to charge AT&T for using THE USER'S broadband pipes for backhaul.
It is critical that any policy management and charging infrastruture is capable of discerning bearer type (which could also be UMA WiFi tunneled via the core on some other networks). Otherwise it makes a total mockery of the concept that policy is intended to align pricing with the underlying costs of service delivery.
It also makes a mockery of the femtocell concept as a mass proposition, if the end-user has to pay more than using their own WiFi. If I was a femto vendor today, I'd be spitting feathers about this, as it completely undermines the positioning vs. WiFi as an offload tool.
I also know that many vendors claim it is feasible to distinguish between femto and macro traffic in their DPI / policy products because I've been asking this specific question to many of them the last month or so. And let's face it, it's pretty obvious if traffic is coming through the carrier's femto gateway - if the operator can be bothered to do the integration, and has a rating/charging system up to the job of differentiating it on the quota and bill.
My guess is that the RAN offload/femto project at AT&T has been disconnected from the tiering/policy initiative. This is not the first example of one isolated aspect of traffic management being disconnected from others. Nor will it likely be the last, given the proliferation of techniques and technologies being deployed. Many will have unfortunate side-effects and unintended consequences - as I discussed regarding video compression / optimisation recently.
It's possible that AT&T recognises the issue and will fix it in time - but at the very least it ought to recognise the issue explicitly.
If you want to know more about the range of mobile broadband traffic management options - and the need for a holistic approach to avoid outcomes like this, you need to read my recent research paper. Details are here, and it's priced from just $350.
Tuesday, June 01, 2010
Does a "coalition of the losers" ever win?
I'm currently looking at a number of mobile application domains, such as messaging, social networking, VoIP and application downloads.
One thing that strikes me is that we frequently see powerful incumbents being challenged by alliances. Apple faces attack from operator-run appstores. Facebook is viewed enviously by others that would like to control social networks. MSN has been pursued by various own-brand IM proponents. Visa and Amex are regularly targeted by new payment mechanisms.
But one regular characteristic of this type of competition in the mobile domain is the "coalition of the losers" approach, usually based on the notion of interoperability as a competitive differentiator. Industry bodies like the GSMA are frequently the drivers of such initiatives, although often they take over a pre-existing coalition.
We've seen failed attempts to build an IM interoperability community. My current view is that the RCS Initiative is also on its last legs (I'm currently writing an "epitaph" paper if anyone would like to try to change my mind). Now we have the Wholesale Application Community. There have been assorted others around payments, identity and mobile broadband (sorry, WiMAX Forum).
But I am struggling to think of a single case in which a losers' coalition has ended up being successful. For that matter, I'm not sure I can think of an example outside the telecoms industry either, where a single powerful Samson has been brought down by a coordinated horde of Davids.
Having 53 previously-ineffectual companies attacking a strong individual player usually just proves that 53 x Zero = Zero
Where change does occur, it's usually another proprietary or standalone player. BlackBerry's Messenger is taking bigger lumps out of MSN's user base than operators' messaging services ever have. It's Facebook that has given MySpace a kicking, not a consortium. Vodafone's M-Pesa has had more of an impact on mobile banking than any number of joint initiatives. Paypal has made the biggest impact on online payments.
In the airline industry, it has been the impact of individual low-cost carriers like Ryanair and Easyjet that have caused the greatest shake-ups, not Star Alliance or OneWorld.
One possible exception might be the Open Handset Alliance, aka Android. And more generally, the open-source model tends to fare a lot better than the "industry collaboration" approach at unseating incumbents.
I'm genuinely curious about this - if anyone has an example where a "coalition of the losers" has been triumphant in mobile, I'd love to know.
One thing that strikes me is that we frequently see powerful incumbents being challenged by alliances. Apple faces attack from operator-run appstores. Facebook is viewed enviously by others that would like to control social networks. MSN has been pursued by various own-brand IM proponents. Visa and Amex are regularly targeted by new payment mechanisms.
But one regular characteristic of this type of competition in the mobile domain is the "coalition of the losers" approach, usually based on the notion of interoperability as a competitive differentiator. Industry bodies like the GSMA are frequently the drivers of such initiatives, although often they take over a pre-existing coalition.
We've seen failed attempts to build an IM interoperability community. My current view is that the RCS Initiative is also on its last legs (I'm currently writing an "epitaph" paper if anyone would like to try to change my mind). Now we have the Wholesale Application Community. There have been assorted others around payments, identity and mobile broadband (sorry, WiMAX Forum).
But I am struggling to think of a single case in which a losers' coalition has ended up being successful. For that matter, I'm not sure I can think of an example outside the telecoms industry either, where a single powerful Samson has been brought down by a coordinated horde of Davids.
Having 53 previously-ineffectual companies attacking a strong individual player usually just proves that 53 x Zero = Zero
Where change does occur, it's usually another proprietary or standalone player. BlackBerry's Messenger is taking bigger lumps out of MSN's user base than operators' messaging services ever have. It's Facebook that has given MySpace a kicking, not a consortium. Vodafone's M-Pesa has had more of an impact on mobile banking than any number of joint initiatives. Paypal has made the biggest impact on online payments.
In the airline industry, it has been the impact of individual low-cost carriers like Ryanair and Easyjet that have caused the greatest shake-ups, not Star Alliance or OneWorld.
One possible exception might be the Open Handset Alliance, aka Android. And more generally, the open-source model tends to fare a lot better than the "industry collaboration" approach at unseating incumbents.
I'm genuinely curious about this - if anyone has an example where a "coalition of the losers" has been triumphant in mobile, I'd love to know.
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